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The Sargent Leader and Legacy
Governorship
Richard A. Hogarty
Following in the long line of succession of his predecessors, Francis W. Sargent
served as the sixty-third governor of Massachusetts. A lifelong Republican, he
was a man of character and sterling Yankee blue-blood lineage with the stature
of a political independent. Grappling with a series of hot political issues and
braving the passions and divisions spawned by the war in Vietnam, he was one
of the ablest and most intriguing men ever to be governor. He worked hard at
knowing his constituents and their concerns, but he did not always provide
them with easy answers. Several new ideas were transformed into policy during
his tenure as governor. Some of these adjustments required trial and error as
well as the courage to face and learn from mistakes. This article reviews
Sargent's political career in depth and evaluates his performance as chief
executive.
History reminds us that nothing counterfeit has any staying power, an obser-
vation, incidentally, made by Cicero about 60 B.C. History teaches that char-
acter counts. Character above all.
— David McCullough, 1998
At the height of his power and popularity, Frank Sargent was the most visible and
influential Republican in Massachusetts. A dynamic and visionary party leader,
he served as governor during the turbulent and event-filled years from 1969 to
1975. A relatively liberal Republican in an overwhelmingly Democratic state,
Sargent recognized the political world in which he lived, accepted it for what it was,
and moved through it with a dash and verve rarely seen in American politics these
days. He reached out for contact and, indeed, for confrontation. Adept at reading
people and sorting out power relationships, he was astute at gauging public opinion
and calculating electoral interests. Relying on his traditional base of Republican
support, he crossed party lines and appealed to liberal Democrats and Independents,
thereby expanding his statewide base. Sargent held the governorship twice, from
1969 to 1970, when he completed the remaining two years of the unexpired term of
his predecessor, John Volpe, and again from 1971 to 1975, when he was elected to a
full four-year term.
Richard Hogarty is professor emeritus and a senior fellow at the John W. McCormack
Institute of Public Affairs, University of Massachusetts Boston.
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Affectionately known by his nickname "Sarge," the Yankee reformer first ran for
lieutenant governor in 1966 on the same ticket with Governor John Volpe, a Repub-
lican powerhouse who carried him into office. Plucked from virtual obscurity,
Sargent adopted the catchy campaign slogan "Put Sarge in charge," which caught on
with the public and became his rallying cry. Becoming lucky, he was thrust into the
governor's office when President Richard Nixon tapped Volpe to become his secre-
tary of transportation in Washington.
I undertake an analysis of Frank Sargent's style and strategy as a public person.
What does Sargent's career tell us about the role of character and personality in
executive politics and decision making? I also examine his leadership style and the
impact he made on the office of governor. The last sections suggest reflectively the
curiously mixed legacy Sargent left behind.
Evaluating the performance of a single governor is no simple undertaking. To
begin with, the sources of power available to a governor are elusive and variable,
and the interpretation of the data used to evaluate performance is in part subjective.
Whether a governor will prevail in a dispute over policy, or even whether he will
become significantly involved, is the result of a subtle combination of factors, not of
a single determinant. A governor is first and foremost a politician whose career de-
pends in large measure on the successful negotiation of bargains. When confronted
with conflicting demands, he helps to maintain a viable society by the process of
brokering mutual concessions. Political bargaining and compromise lie at the heart
of the political process. The will to conquer and to make a difference also comes
into play.
In terms of the historical development of the office, Frank Sargent undoubtedly
benefited from the contributions of the sixty-two governors, an incredibly assorted
lot, who had preceded him. Some were rogues and thieves; some the mere agents of
business moguls and party bosses; some were amiable nonentities, adept at platitude
and evasion, who served their terms and faded into deserved oblivion. Still others
were men of ability and personal distinction who would compare favorably with any
group of chiefs of state drawn from a comparable society that developed in three
centuries from a collection of a few hundred hardy settlers to a metropolitan state of
6 million people. 1
Both in style and strategy, Sargent represented a sharp break from his predeces-
sors. Looking on the governorship as a unique position of responsibility, he saw
himself as the chief problem solver. Politics for him was a game of risk. Like most
elected officials, he kept his advocacy general, positioning himself to take credit for
successes and to join the critics in the event of failure. Even this approach involved
a modicum of risk that he would be blamed if things went wrong, but he realized it
need not be fatal. His politics were hardly cautious. Where he differed most from his
fellow governors was in choosing to lead rather than simply follow the dictates of
the legislature. Dating back to colonial and revolutionary times, there had always
been a strong tradition of legislative supremacy in Massachusetts. The Governor's
Council, which had to approve almost everything a governor did, was purposely
created as a political check on he executive.
For more than a century after the adoption of its 1780 Constitution, the legislature
was for all practical purposes the state government. The governor's formal role in
policymaking was very small, and his informal authority depended on his personal-
ity and his party strength. Although elected at large, the governor served in office
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for a term of two years, subject to reelection. This short term limit seriously re-
stricted his ability to get his programs enacted. A handful of governors attained
considerable power during the first half of the twentieth century, but the legislature
still remained dominant. 2 In marked contrast, Sargent was a prime example of a gov-
ernor who both in crisis and in ordinary times broadened gubernatorial authority.
When he cared intensely about a given issue, he reached out for the views of others
and responded to ideas that would garner support from a coalition of interests. In so
doing, he exerted the kind of policy leadership that had rarely been found in any of
the previous administrations.
An Altered Political and Cultural Landscape
As a point of departure, it is important to acknowledge that Governor Sargent came
to power in a tumultuous era, a time of great social upheaval in America. Numerous
combustible elements were present, including high unemployment, rampant infla-
tion, oil shortages, and recession. Assassinations, growing protests against the esca-
lating war in Vietnam, civil rights demonstrations, urban riots, prison uprisings,
racial violence over school busing, tenants rights, welfare rights, and countless other
public discontents surfaced. Cities were beset with seemingly intractable problems.
Slums, poverty, street crime, drug abuse, and gang wars were among the social ills
that menaced the quality of urban life.
There was a general sense of alienation among minorities across the country.
Many blacks and Latinos felt marginalized or left out of the political system. Politics
for them was not the same as politics for other ethnic groups. The 1965 Voting
Rights Act and the black power movement had produced some gains for black
Americans, but the underlying racism continued. The spillover effects of the Viet-
nam War, which drained the nation's resources to fight the war against poverty at
home, poisoned the domestic policy. Student protests and campus riots disrupted
university life. Dissenting groups marched in the streets, took over public buildings,
and shut down colleges in order to protest what they believed to be an unjust war in
Southeast Asia and inequalities at home. These societal and economic forces com-
bined to make the forging of gubernatorial policy a hard job.
A state constitutional amendment, adopted in 1964, had lengthened gubernatorial
terms from two to four years, so Frank Sargent had twenty-two months to consoli-
date his position before facing the electorate. When he became governor in January
1969, at the age of fifty-four, he was viewed as a political lightweight. After all, he
had been a Volpe loyalist or acolyte and was not considered a force in his own right.
The transition was fairly smooth because he picked up where Volpe had left off, but
he assumed office with few ideas in mind and without a clear public agenda. But as
time went on, Sargent emerged as an independent chief executive who proved to be
quite different from Volpe.
The tempo of gubernatorial initiative varies with the disposition of the incum-
bent, be he passive or active, positive or negative. Sargent was inclined to be active
and positive, and the pace of the policy process increased accordingly. His intention
from the outset was to make himself a highly visible governor, a symbol of energy
and motion, accepting responsibility for a broad range of public issues, seeking to
be innovative on the one hand and reactive on the other. Innovations were more
likely to ensue when he had to deal with a crisis, for then he was more reactive than
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engaged. He gravitated to the politics of innovation, although the circumstances were
often less than auspicious.
For as long as he was in office, Sargent made the most of his political opportunity,
but he had to deal with a legislature controlled by Democrats. This is where his abil-
ity to set aside partisanship and to work with partisans of a different persuasion
came into play. By the time he finished his second term in 1975, he had achieved
significant reforms in urban transportation, public housing, civil rights, environmen-
tal protection, mental health, gun control, special education, public welfare, juvenile
and adult correctional systems, social services for children and the elderly, and con-
sumer protection.
The Republicans had been the dominant party in Massachusetts ever since the
end of the Civil War, but they were now declining in numerical strength. While they
controlled the governorship from 1964 to 1974, the Democrats had controlled the
legislature since 1958. The Republicans, no longer able to mount serious contests
for the less visible statewide offices, were plunging ever deeper into minority party
status. By the early 1970s, they were outnumbered in the legislature by almost a
three to one margin. In fact, registered Democrats greatly outnumbered registered
Republicans, and the number of Independents was on the rise. The Bay State was
considered Kennedy territory.
Not surprisingly, the Massachusetts voters rejected President Richard Nixon
when he ran for reelection in 1972, voting for U.S. Senator George McGovern of
South Dakota, who accused Nixon of prolonging the unpopular war in Vietnam. A
bastion of liberalism, Massachusetts could claim the distinction of being the only
state to go for McGovern, a lesson not lost on its citizens. When the Watergate scan-
dal broke in 1974, bumper stickers sent a subtle but sobering message to the rest of
the nation: Don't Blame Me — I'm From Massachusetts.
Against the onslaughts of this volatile environment, Sargent grappled with the
new realities of changing life in America and dealt in practical fashion with the
pressing public issues of the day. Considering the hundreds of bills that he signed
into law, three deserve special mention. One was the so-called anti-snob zoning law,
which mandated low-income public housing in the suburbs, the first such legisla-
tion in the nation. The no-fault insurance bill eliminated unnecessary litigation and
thereby reduced the high costs of automobile insurance, while the Shea bill chal-
lenged the legality of the Vietnam War. The last two pieces of legislation were spon-
sored by liberal Democrats Michael Dukakis and James Shea, respectively. The Shea
bill, which put the state in prominent opposition to the war, was later declared un-
constitutional by the courts. Sadly, Shea ended his life in suicide. Considered a ris-
ing star from his earliest days, Dukakis was an ambitious Brookline lawyer who had
already set his sights on the governorship.
Sargent — A New Kind of Republican
Sargent was an amalgam of North Shore patrician and hardy Cape Cod fisherman.
Having lived intermittently in both parts of the state, he was a purebred New En-
gland Yankee. His architectural education at MIT signaled a break from the tradi-
tional Harvard Law School career path. All of which meant that he not only had a
technological capacity, but also used his technical knowledge for problem solving
and identifying policy alternatives.
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Sargent was neither your typical, dyed-in-the-wool, conservative Republican nor
an ideologue, which gave him wide latitude in decision making.' Reared in the pro-
gressive Yankee reform tradition, he was in some ways a throwback to President
Theodore Roosevelt. Like Roosevelt, Sargent, whose passion was the environment,
was an ardent conservationist who sought to save the Massachusetts shoreline. He
championed issues like clean air, clean water, and open space. He was an environ-
mentalist before the term came into popular usage, and the celebration of Earth Day
arrived before the term had entered the public consciousness. When most of Cape
Cod was still relatively unspoiled, Sargent sounded the alarm about the impending
danger to its pristine sand dunes and beaches, which were gradually being destroyed
by the construction of new housing and large-scale commercial developments. To
prevent such a calamity from happening, he spearheaded a crusade to establish what
became the Cape Cod National Seashore. But more about that later.
If Sargent had a political hero, it was New York City's mayor, John Lindsay, who
had successfully cast aside his traditional base of Republican support and built po-
litical alliances that depended heavily on liberal support. As political actors,
Sargent and Lindsay were paired comfortably in ideology and outlook. Both were
liberal Republicans who understood and exploited their position as popularly
elected chief executives. Both exercised their executive powers forcefully and inde-
pendently, acting as they thought conditions demanded and their conception of the
office permitted. Eventually, Lindsay changed his party affiliation and became a
Democrat; Sargent remained on the reservation but distanced himself from Richard
Nixon as far as possible, a position that less than endeared him to right-wing conser-
vatives, who increasingly dominated his party. Simply put, he possessed the intel-
lect, mental toughness, and combativeness that were necessary to survive the nasty
political wars at the State House. Secure in his convictions about how the world
operated, he was willing to take risks and to push the boundaries of policy leader-
ship. Nothing written about him disputes this interpretation.
The Interplay of Personality and Politics
The interplay of personality and politics had a lot to do with Sargent's success. Very
much the pragmatist, he typically managed to intersperse his comments with good
humor, which did a lot to soothe chaffed egos. While he delighted in taunting his
political adversaries, he also offered them words of kindness and encouragement
when life dealt its blows. Democrats, who watched him perform, concede that the wit
and charm he used with a flourish did not come at the expense of his principles. As
former Senate president Kevin Harrington recalls, "He was a physically and men-
tally tough guy. When he believed in something, nobody could argue him in or out
of anything."4 While Sarge frequently "went along to get along," he was no Puritan
and had no difficulty compromising in order to cut deals. Nonetheless, he was deter-
mined to lean hard in directions that he believed to be right.
Sargent had a knack for sizing up a situation and turning it to his advantage.
When adequately provoked or frustrated, he could get mad and swear like a trooper,
but a self-deprecating wit reassured people that he did not take himself too seri-
ously. He enjoyed the public limelight and the excitement of political life, but he
was aware of its dark side. On one occasion he admitted, "When anyone asks me if
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they should go into politics. I always say, 'Can your marriage stand it?' Politics is de-
manding, frustrating, and doesn't ever stop."-
More than one political rival referred to Sargent as the Marlboro man. Others
referred to him as a tree hugger. In the words of John Powers, "He was the Yankee
Republican poster boy (Norman Rockwell actually painted his portrait), spare and
angular with sandy hair, a lantern jaw. and the 'S' whistling through his teeth, living
out in horse country, growing his own vegetables, and spending not a nickel more
than necessary." 6
Given his looks and resonant voice, Sargent learned how to use these assets to
his advantage, especially on television. He became adroit at using this medium to
mobilize public opinion in support of his programs, even if at times it meant going
over the head of the legislature to say what needed to be done. He fully exploited
the public relations potential of the office. His messages to the legislature were
consciously addressed to a wider public. In a 1974 interview Sargent commented,
"As a governor, you're not a dictator. You have to be able to persuade the people.
One of the problems is getting too far out in front of public opinion." 7 Whatever the
inspiration, he had the ability to educate and the capacity to appear concerned with
the problems of everyone while remaining calm and collected in the midst of a
political whirlwind. In an era when the word politician was becoming increasingly
associated with greed, corruption, and venality, he had a reputation for honesty,
integrity, and independence.
In 1938. Sargent had married well — Jessie Fay, a Yankee of impeccable lineage.
Like her husband, she enjoyed the outdoors and did more than her share of volun-
teer work in the community. Sargent was a Unitarian, his wife an Episcopalian.
Jessie was a liberal Republican who campaigned for her husband and supported
social issues dealing with day care centers, elderly affairs, mental retardation, low-
income housing, and juvenile detention centers. She played a leading role in the
Women's Political Caucus and co-chaired a state Commission on Citizen Participa-
tion. In her aptly titled book The Governor's Wife, Jessie defined her role.
As a Governor's wife, I am never in a position to raise a shrill voice. My efforts
are often low-keyed and behind the scenes. I have to be aware of "bad press" and
behaving in a manner not embarrassing to my husband or the administration ... I
strongly believe that a wife can be a tremendous campaign asset and the better
she is known before the election the more help she can be. If she's been to a
neighborhood before, made friends there, helped with local projects and shown
concern for their local problems, the candidate's wife can be a major help for
gaining endorsement of her husband's policies and candidacy. 8
Glimpses of the Private Man
In his private life, Sargent was surrounded by close friends and a lifestyle that only
those whose wealth was extraordinary could afford. Politically he may have cham-
pioned the needs of the poor and disadvantaged, but socially he gravitated toward
the rich and powerful. Both he and his wife were very private people, Jessie the
more private of the two. 9 They had a private life as well as a public life. They were
accessible yet inaccessible. That was part of their mystique.
In political parlance, Sargent had what is known as the common touch. Douglas
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Foy, director of the Conservation Law Foundation, tells the story about Sarge's driving
up to a toll booth on the Massachusetts Turnpike, quickly reading the toll collector's
name tag, and striking up a friendly conversation with him. He, of course, had never met
the man, but that was beside the point. While the toll collector represented a potential
vote, the governor interacted with him both as a public and a private man.
Another story is told about Sargent's befriending a young eleven-year-old boy while
attending a World Series baseball game at Fenway Park in October 1967, the year of the
"Impossible Dream," with the Boston Red Sox playing the Saint Louis Cardinals. The
boy's father, who had purchased two separate tickets from a scalper, was unable to sit
with his son, so he planted him in a box seat next to the lieutenant governor. Thirty-one
years later, the youngster, by then a grown man, recounted what happened:
Sargent treated me as if I was the most important guy in the ballpark. It was as if
we had gone to the game together. He asked me if I wanted a hot dog. popcorn,
peanuts, whatever. I was keeping the box score, and as the game went on Sarge
would lean over and say, "What'd he do his last time up?" or "How many has
Lonborg struck out?" The box was swarming with visitors, of course, all looking to
shake Sarge's hand or talk a little politics. I still remember that late in the game,
Yaz got up and singled cleanly to right. Sarge stood up, applauded, and said, to no
one in particular, "That's a damn good hit." 11
Sargent described himself as being from the "fin, fur, and feather folks." 12 A hunt-
ing companion recalled an incident that took place in the predawn darkness. "We
used to hunt together. I remember when he'd show up in the early morning, fire off
his shotgun right beneath my bedroom window, and yell, "Get up, you lazy bum." 13
Subtlety was not his strong suit.
As a fisherman, Sargent became acquainted with all kinds of people in a world far
removed from Beacon Hill. He told this shaggy dog tale about the owner of
Thompson's Clam Bar and Wychmere Harbor Club on the Cape.
I got to know almost everybody on the waterfront. There was a guy who ran a
place where you could sell your fish, and he used to drink like a son-of-a-bitch.
One day he was stiff and he spotted me as he was going by our house. "Sarge.
where the hell have you been?" he called out. "I've been in bed with sciatica," I
told him. "Who's she?" he said. Well, Jessie was there and she died laughing. 14
These episodes provide us with glimpses of the lesser-known Sargent who was
seldom seen in public. His son Bill says that his father "loved doing things that kids
loved to do. He was more like a grandfather to us." 15 It is essential to understand the
personal element because it was such a vitally important aspect of his power.
Sargent's Inner Circle and Decision-making Style
While Sargent had a fairly clear sense of where he fit in the political spectrum, he
had little patience with philosophic discussion and very limited curiosity about
issues until they were actually thrust upon him. He craved being at the center of
political action and enjoyed dealing with urgent and momentous choices. Sargent's
single most important quality was his ability to make bold decisions. He liked to make
decisions in a quasi-judicial mode, preferring to let things bubble up and choosing from
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among alternatives developed and debated by his staff. 16
As governor, Sargent operated on the principle of centralized management. He
assembled a small staff and appointed the best people he could find to head the
various executive departments and agencies. They were a mix of old and new faces
largely picked by Sargent. The inner circle consisted of four men with whom he had
worked closely prior to becoming governor: Donald Dwight, a mainstream moderate
Republican; Albert Kramer, a liberal Democrat and former state representative who
came from an urban working-class district in Chelsea; Robert Yasi, a former civil
servant who understood the workings of the state bureaucracy; and Jack Flannery, a
former newsman who worried about Sargent's political stakes and how he fared with
the media. As the pressures of office descended upon them, these advisers struggled
for the governor's mind, and they served him well. Dwight and Kramer remained the
main policy advocates; Flannery served as a counterweight to Kramer. Steve
Teichner and Tom Reardon, another newspaperman, joined this group somewhat
later. Both Reardon and Flannery advanced the administration's position with edi-
tors and writers.
Alan Altshuler, an MIT academic who headed the governor's task force on high-
ways and later became his secretary of transportation and construction, points out,
"Sargent's personal inner circle had a high degree of continuity through his six
years in office, and it remained dominant, even after the cabinet came into being, on
matters that seemed to involve high personal stakes for the governor." 17 The gover-
nor sought to avoid becoming captured by the special interests and clientele groups
that abound in public life. He trusted his staff to sort out the arguments put forward
by outsiders and to craft his best alternatives. Sometimes his staff second-guessed
his agency and department heads, which became a source of friction and internal
squabbles.
Martha Weinberg's Managing the State, published in 1977, provides a detailed
account of Sargent's relationship as governor with four specific state agencies. Ac-
cording to Weinberg, Sargent tried to exercise some degree of executive control
over the Department of Public Works and the Department of Public Welfare, but he
did not attempt to do so with the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency and the
Department of Mental Health. These agencies are good examples of his willingness
to intervene when he perceived there was a public or political crisis and to remain
relatively unengaged in issues where these imperatives did not exist. Weinberg ar-
gues that Sargent remained both crisis-oriented and reactive throughout his tenure,
responding to the flow of pressing issues and limiting himself to selecting from
among options developed by others. 18
Sargent embraced an active, involved role for government and accepted the real-
ity of the welfare state. These were trends thoroughly consistent with the governor's
temperament and philosophy. Most Republican politicians, by instinct and disposi-
tion, went the other way. Portrayed in the media as "a maverick governor of a maver-
ick state," Sargent was a leader whose popular appeal transcended party lines. 19 The
archetype of a new breed of crossover politician, he was shrewd enough to reach out
to Democrats and Independents alike. Charles Kenney and Robert Turner, two vet-
eran State House reporters who watched the Sargent battles at close range, described
him in these terms, "Though a Republican, he was moderate to liberal on most is-
sues, and he relished the give-and-take that were an essential part of relations with
the Democratic legislature. Most important, the voters loved him." 20
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In 1970, Sargent the incumbent easily won his party's nomination for governor.
He picked Donald Dwighl as his running mate. In the general election, he ran against
Democrat Kevin White, the mayor of Boston. Campaigning throughout the state.
Sargent not only energized his Republican base, but he appealed to women, blacks,
Hispanics, and the elderly. At one point, he lost his voice to laryngitis, so his wife
and three grown children had to fill in for him as surrogates. When the ballots were
finally counted, Sargent had defeated White by 259,354 votes, representing 56.7
percent of the total, to win his first full term as governor. Much to the chagrin of his
opponent, Sargent even carried the city of Boston. After a grueling campaign, hav-
ing won the corner office in his own right, he was no longer an accidental governor.
The morning after the election, Sargent and White had breakfast together at the
Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Boston. As Sargent recalled, "When we were done, Kevin
grabbed for the bill," and said, "I know goddamn well you're not going to pay for
this."
21 Sargent enjoyed jousting with Irish Democrats, and as a Yankee Republican
he made an easy target for them. The governor was adept at playing ethnic politics.
He was especially fond of attending the annual Saint Patrick's Day brunch at
Dorgan's restaurant in South Boston hosted by state senator William Bulger, a stand-
up comedian in his own right. Both men enjoyed roasting each other in a good-na-
tured way. This breakfast of corned beef and cabbage was a ritual of Irish-American
political culture. While campaigning in certain neighborhoods, like Boston's North
End, Sargent never failed to mention his Italian grandmother. He also boasted of his
membership in the Braintree Lodge of the Sons of Italy, which further cemented his
relations with the Italian population of the state.
Sargent governed more by the sheer force of his personality than by any grant of
formal authority. In many ways, his personality matched his politics. He enjoyed march-
ing in parades, slapping backs, pumping hands, and hanging out with Irish politicians
who loved to needle him. Kevin White once commented that Sargent was the best he had
ever seen in a parade, that he could make eye contact with every man, woman, and child
along the parade route.22 He was a relatively simple man, not complex or Machiavellian.
David Nyhan, one of the most perceptive commentators on the Massachusetts political
scene, drew this portrait of him:
What the political community prized most in Frank Sargent was the laughter. No
politician of his rank had more fun in office, as often at his own expense as at
another's. He was not a complicated man, of twisted psyche, inner turmoil, or
desperate ambition. Frank was Frank: a beautiful man, a solid friend, an able
leader, an honest public servant. And a million laughs. What's not to prize in such
a splendid fellow?23
Having risen through the ranks of the fish-and-game and the public works bu-
reaucracies, Sargent brought twenty-two years of experience in government to the
task. The only thing he lacked was legislative experience, but this proved to be more
of a political asset than a liability. He knew a lot about how government worked and
who all the key players were. This knowledge and experience, coupled with his
determination to lead rather than follow, made him a different kind of governor.
Looking back at the social and economic conditions that existed in the Bay State
driving the late 1960s and early 1970s, the political situation was clearly manipulable
from the vantage point of someone like Sargent. He believed that there was no point in
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holding power unless it could be used effectively. Furthermore, he recognized the social
ferment and discontent that were brewing in Massachusetts and understood the reasons
that caused people to press for social change. He used the bully pulpit whenever he
thought it necessary, but he seldom preached to people. There is ample evidence to sug-
gest that constituency and leader were attuned to each other's calculations.
Toward the end of his second term, however, Sargent would come to recognize that
the magic had gone out of the enterprise. A booming economy had enabled him to create
and expand programs without major tax increases until his final year. In October 1973,
the economy began to falter with the disruption of oil supplies, which was compounded
by rising unemployment and double-digit inflation, or what became known as
"stagflation." Sargent's star was sinking fast and with it any grand notions of a third term.
In his bid for reelection in 1974, he faced a formidable Democratic opponent in Michael
Dukakis, who appealed to the same constituencies that Sargent had cultivated.
But as the campaign wore on, Sargent seemed to stumble and became preoccupied
with falling public opinion polls and day-to-day crises. Not only had he drifted away
from his conservative Republican base, he had also antagonized it. A big flap was made
about his borrowing $40,000 from his wife to finance his campaign, violating the provi-
sions of a recently passed campaign-finance law. In typical fashion, Sargent dismissed
this disclosure with wry humor. He told the Everett Rotary Club that he was sorry he did
not arrive in time for lunch. "I couldn't come up with the price of the ticket," he said
solemnly. "Jessie wouldn't lend me the dough."24
It turned out to be a hard-fought and bitterly contested campaign. On Election
Day, Dukakis garnered 992,284 votes, 53.5 percent of the total, as compared with
Sargent's 784,353. Sargent was defeated by factors beyond his control. The Republi-
cans had held the governorship since 1964 and it was time for a change. Sargent
shrugged off his defeat by blaming it on "the price of hamburg." As he put it, "I
didn't blow my stack at all. I could kind of see it coming."25 Whether the economy
was the substantial cause of his defeat no one can say for certain, but it was surely
among the major causes. Racial violence over court-ordered school busing had
erupted in Boston in September 1974, just two months prior to the election. Sargent
supported the state's Racial Imbalance Act of 1965, and as the chief law enforce-
ment officer, he sent in National Guard troops to quell the civil disturbance. 26 The
presence of state troops inflamed passions, especially in South Boston, which be-
came a hotbed of antibusing. Through the ever present lens of network television,
the nation watched the ugly upheaval unleashed by the desegregation orders of
federal judge Arthur Garrity. To top it off, Watergate, the Nixon pardon, oil shock,
and the faltering economy all made 1974 a disastrous year for the Republican Party
nationally. Sargent ran about as far ahead of the rest of the Republican ticket as he
had in winning a comfortable victory four years earlier, but the outcome this time
was a crushing defeat.
The Political Apprenticeship
Frank Sargent was born on July 29, 1915, in the small rural town of Hamilton, Massachu-
setts, where the social elite on the North Shore played polo and other equestrian sports. A
patrician by birth and disposition, he could lay claim to a sterling Yankee background.
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Reared a child of privilege, he was a half cousin to the famous American painter John
Singer Sargent. These family credentials gave him impeccable native-born, blue-blood
status. Not much is known about his early childhood except that his father died when
Frank was only three years old. His maternal grandfather, George Lee, who was a former
New England amateur boxing and sculling champion, instilled in him the love of the
outdoors. Lee also contributed to the future political fortunes of his grandson by marry-
ing an Italian woman, Eva Ballarini.
Sargent and his brother grew up in a family without a father or one they would
never come to know. The family had an Irish nurse who helped to raise the two boys.
This set of circumstances may explain psychologically why the future governor
needed to make friends and later why he got along so well with Irish politicians. His
mother eventually married Arthur Adams. The Adams family, direct descendants of
President John Quincy Adams, were quite conservative while the Sargents were very
liberal. There were tensions between the two families. Young Frank Sargent was sent
to the exclusive Noble and Greenough School in Dedham, where he developed his
social graces and prepared for college. There he wanted everybody to be his friend,
including the teachers and janitors.27 In 1935, he passed up Harvard, a Brahmin
preserve, to study architecture at MIT.
After graduating from MIT in 1939, Sargent joined the prestigious Boston archi-
tectural firm of Coolidge, Shepley, Bulfinch and Abbott, apprenticing as a draftsman.
For a brief period, he worked as a carpenter to learn the building trades firsthand. He
and a MIT classmate opened a small architect's office. Shortly after the Japanese
bombed Pearl Harbor, Sargent enlisted in the U.S. Army. An accomplished skier, he
volunteered as a ski trooper and was assigned to the famed 10th Mountain Division,
which trained hard in Colorado for alpine combat. Rising in the ranks from private
to captain, he fought in Italy, where he was wounded twice and earned the Purple
Heart and Bronze Star. His combat record would later serve him in good stead with
veterans groups.
On returning from the war, Sargent devoted himself to his career and to raising a
family. The war had changed his outlook on life. Abandoning architecture, he settled
in Orleans on Cape Cod to earn a living doing what he loved most, namely, hunting
and fishing. In the fall he worked as a duck guide, in the winter he fished commer-
cially for lobster and halibut, and in the spring and summer he ran a charter boat out
of Rock Harbor. He also operated a successful sporting goods business and opened
the Goose Hummock Shop on Route 6A. One of the shop's early best-sellers was a
goose decoy that Sargent had fashioned from cork insulation board and a fishnet
float.
Before long, Sargent grew bored with running his business. His advocacy of fish-
ermen would take him into politics. In Rock Harbor he had heard stories about the
illegal netting of striped bass. He investigated the matter and started a crusade to
stop this abuse. Sargent invited Republican governor Robert Bradford to board his
boat and see for himself. He showed Bradford that the current laws were not working
properly. Bradford then asked him to become the state's director of marine fisheries
in 1947. Sargent agreed to take the job for the winter but remained in the post for
almost ten years.
Commercial fishermen were upset by the appointment of a man whom they con-
sidered an amateur and dilettante, but Sargent surprised them by shipping out with
the Boston trawler fleet and working as one of the crew on the Grand Banks. He also
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devoted considerable time speaking to rod-and-gun clubs, garden clubs, Audubon
groups, and other conservationists about the dangers of pollution. In Sargent's own
words, "I used to be kind of a voice in the wilderness, railing against pollution of
our tidal waters and marshes. Some hunters and fishermen listened, but others were
more interested in how many trout you were going to stock in Round Pond, even
though a developer might pollute the pond." 28 (Interestingly, this occurred before
Rachel Carlson had written Silent Spring, which was published in 1962.)
From 1959 to 1962, Sargent went to Washington to serve as executive director of
a temporary federal commission on recreational open-space resources. In this capac-
ity, he formed a unique partnership to save the Cape Cod shoreline by creating a new
park. It was an auspicious time for such a venture. Alarmed by urban sprawl and the
proliferation of housing subdivisions that threatened to change forever the pristine
shoreline, Sargent took a lead position in promoting this audacious project. The idea
was anathema to many local real estate agents and businessmen who objected on the
grounds that they would be hurt financially. Others worried that it would bring a
rush of tourists, spoiling the habitat and overrunning their quiet communities. En-
listing the support of U.S. senators John F. Kennedy and Leverett Saltonstall, along
with philanthropist Paul Mellon, Sargent overcame fierce, shortsighted local opposi-
tion by taking a novel approach to the problem of land protection. Previous national
parks had been created by federal land purchases and private funding. To these
techniques, the group added a zoning agreement among the six affected localities to
set aside the land and limit development. To minimize political opposition, private
landowners were allowed to retain ownership of their land for a period of ninety-
nine years, but they had to agree not to develop it. On August 7, 1961, President
Kennedy signed the law creating the Cape Cod National Seashore, which set aside
44,600 acres of land, including forty miles of shoreline on the Great Beach and ten
miles flanking Cape Cod Bay.
On his return to Massachusetts in 1962, Sargent ran unsuccessfully for state sena-
tor in Barnstable County. He lost in a Republican primary, mainly for lack of time
and poor organization, but he learned from his mistakes. In 1963 he accepted an
appointment from Democratic governor Endicott Peabody to serve as an associate
commissioner of the Department of Public Works. The DPW had just been reorga-
nized following a major scandal, so this was a fairly visible reform appointment.
While undertaking the assignment, he met Al Kramer, who helped him clean up the
mess in the scandal-ridden department.
When Republican John Volpe became governor again in 1965, he named Sargent
chair of the commission, making him the head of the department. The conservation-
ist had now become a public road builder. In his DPW role, Sargent was responsible
for planning and design work on interstate expressway projects, and he led a suc-
cessful effort to secure legislation eliminating local authority to veto state highway
projects. In 1966 Volpe picked Sargent as his running mate, and the rest, as they say,
is history.
A Maverick Party Leader
Governor Francis Sargent was the chief spokesman for the liberal wing of the state
Republican Party. By virtue of his office, he was the leader of his party, half be-
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holdcn to it, sometimes able to bend it to his own vision. Parly organization and party
discipline were never as strong as some observers remember, but they were influential
factors in nominating and electing a governor. Still, the links were not strong. Sargent's
liberal views frequently clashed with those of right-wing conservative Republicans. As
the years went on, the chasm between the two sides became wide and deep, and they
were clearly estranged. A more serious and potentially more damaging chasm appeared
among members of the Republican State Committee. Martha Weinberg observed regard-
ing Sargent,
The Republican state committee regarded him with suspicion because of his liberal
policies, his appointment of many Democrats to positions in his administration, his
refusal to back unilaterally all party candidates, and his lukewarm response to the
candidacy of Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew. Sargent, in turn, did not rely
heavily on the state Republican party organization but instead built "Governor
Sargent Committees" in each county in the state. Although several times he at-
tempted to purge the Republican State Committee of his opponents, he relied on
his own organization to attract the Independents and Democrats whom he needed
to survive in Massachusetts, where a large majority of registered voters are Demo-
crats and Independents. 29
Sargent possessed an inner ballast that was absolutely unshakable. He got along
better with Democratic legislative leaders than with some members of his own party.
This group included House speaker David Bartley and two consecutive Senate presi-
dents, Maurice Donahue and Kevin Harrington. Their power relationships reflected
a partial truce in the cultural wars that had long pitted the Irish against the Yankees.
For the moment, however, Sargent had little time for such lofty considerations. At
the beginning, their relations were untested. To break the ice, the governor put on
his desk a sign that read Don't Ask Me, I Didn't Go to Harvard, and he set about
wooing enough Democratic lawmakers to allow him to function. By his own admis-
sion, "I pissed off some Republicans, but there was no other way to get anything
done."30 His wooing of Democrats made for prudent politics because it enabled him
to get most of his legislative program enacted. He essentially led a coalition govern-
ment.
Halting the Construction of Boston Expressways
Immediately on taking office in January 1969, Sargent was confronted by neighbor-
hood and environmental activists seeking to stop five interstate expressway projects
scheduled for completion in the Boston metropolitan region. These included the
Inner Belt, 1-95, 1-93, the Southwest Expressway, and the Route 2 extension. The
extension of Interstate 95 would have cut through Roxbury, the Back Bay, Cam-
bridge, Somerville, and Charlestown and would have required the demolition of
about 3,800 homes. It would have also damaged a natural wildlife and conservation
area, Fowl Meadow in the Canton-Milton woods. Many homes of low-income fami-
lies had already been taken by eminent domain and bulldozed for clearance. 31 With some
buildings partially demolished and others completely reduced to rubble, the Southwest
Corridor looked like a bombed-out World War II German city.
Since the community organizers had mobilized a large number of poor minorities
who marched on the State House, their demands could hardly be ignored. The protest
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movement was quite successful, given the redistributive objectives that the protestors
were pursuing. Day by day, week by week, media-savvy community groups dominated
the public discussion, keeping the issues in their favored frame and putting the Depart-
ment of Public Works on the defensive.
Cross-pressured, Sargent was cautious in his initial response. After four months,
however, he announced that he would appoint a special task force to review pending
highway plans for the Boston region. He did not do so until September 1969. To
chair the task force, he named Alan Altshuler, a professor of political science at MIT,
who had written on the politics of transportation and planning. The task force in-
cluded a mix of business leaders, academics, and independent professionals but no
one who had taken a public position on the projects in dispute.
In January 1970, Altshuler informed the governor that the task force would rec-
ommend a moratorium on the controversial expressways and the development of a
new, environmentally sensitive plan for a major highway and mass transit facilities
in the Boston area. At the time, no American governor had ever halted work on an
interstate expressway. This was truly the meeting of the moment, the man, and the
place.
The task force's recommendations touched off an intense, month-long debate that
the governor structured with his inner circle. Donald Dwight opposed the morato-
rium; Al Kramer favored it. Altshuler, who took a middle-ground position, wanted to
kill some, but not all, of the proposed expressways and build the remainder at re-
duced scale. As Altshuler recalled, "Sargent confided privately that he thought I was
very likely right technically, but he did not see who would support my middle-
ground position. The pro-highway and anti-highway forces were so polarized that he
felt compelled to choose one or the other in clear-cut fashion."32
Sargent benefited from the highly politicized context in which policy was being
formulated. Facing the electorate that year, he was searching for issues, allies, and
liberal credentials for the forthcoming election in which he would emerge the win-
ner. Ironically, Sargent, who had previously been pro-highway, came down squarely
on the side of the environmentalists and neighborhood groups. His intuition for the
bold stroke was at hand. The solution, he decided, was to call a halt to construction.
On February 11, 1970, Sargent appeared on television to announce his decision
publicly. The governor endorsed the task force's recommendations and declared a
moratorium on the five expressway projects. His message was simple and compel-
ling. Taking note of his role as former DPW commissioner, he told his viewing audi-
ence, "Nearly everyone was sure highways were the only answer to transportation
problems for years to come. But we were wrong."33 In making such a dramatic turn-
about, Sargent took a giant step in defining his public image, emphasizing that he
cared about the soft side of politics. His critics thought they could see him manipu-
lating the issue for votes.
But Sargent had no money to carry out the recommended planning study, which
was necessary if he was to replace the discarded plan with a new one. The task force
had estimated a need for $3.5 million, which the Democratic, pro-highway legisla-
ture was not about to provide. The Federal Highway Administration was certain to be
hostile. Frank Turner, the federal highway administrator, soon forecast publicly that
Boston would strangle on its traffic unless the proposed expressways were built.
Sargent's only hope was that John Volpe might be persuaded to overrule his sub-
ordinates, but such persuasion would be most difficult. Volpe as governor had been
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fully supportive of the projects to be halted. Sargent had put off informing Volpe of
his decision until an hour before he went on television, because he did not want to
offer him an opening to argue the issue.
A few days later, Sargent, along with Allshuler and Massachusetts Bay Transit
Authority chairman Robert Wood, went to Washington to meet with Volpe in the vice
president's office. There was every indication that this meeting would be sensitive.
Volpe marched in with his entourage and immediately started lecturing Sargent. He
told him that he was listening to the wrong people, then pointed directly at Alan
Altshuler. Fortunately, Volpe had his own in-house liberal assistant, Joseph Bosco,
whose views were shifting in this peak year of environmentalism. As things turned
out, the Massachusetts delegation got the funding they needed.
Sargent won the election and moved ahead with the Boston Transportation Plan-
ning Review in 1971. Although it ultimately resulted in the cancellation of every
major highway project proposed for the Boston metropolitan area, the BTPR process
was not intended to achieve such a result. Rather, it was an effort to assess the rela-
tive costs and benefits of a variety of strategies for addressing the region's transpor-
tation needs. 34 It soon became clear that some projects, including the Inner Belt and
the Route 2 extension, could not be built without enormous disruption.. Conse-
quently, in December 1971, Sargent dropped both roads from further consider-
ation.
35
Calming an Antiwar Protest
As the Vietnam War and resistance to it escalated, it became increasingly difficult to
keep the peace at home. Antiwar demonstrations and protests were common occur-
rences. When the young rebelled against the accustomed norms, the reaction was
often severe. Older generations of Americans, especially those who had served in
World War II and Korea, were outraged by what they perceived as the rejections of
patriotism. Most governors in America responded to these crises by sending antiriot
squads into the streets, often using tear gas and billy clubs. With a Republican presi-
dent in the White House, Sargent was the first Republican governor to come out
against the war. His support of the Shea bill was a litmus test. 36 Yet, in response to an
urgent request from Harvard president Nathan Pusey, the governor ordered state
police to break up the occupation of University Hall. Several students were arrested
and sent to jail.
In 1970, when the Ohio National Guard killed students at Kent State University,
the pot was boiling over on campuses across the country. In Boston, thousands of
angry students descended upon the State House and held an antiwar rally. One of
their speakers demanded that the American flag be lowered to half mast as a tribute
to those slain at Kent State. Shouts of "lower the flag" rippled through the surging
crowd and soon reached a crescendo. Two frightened capitol policemen stood guard
at the flagpole.
This scene set the stage for what followed. Looking out the window of his corner
office, Sargent asked his staff what would happen to the capitol police if the flag was not
lowered. 37 He realized that they would probably be injured. Since the students were only
asking for respect, he ordered Donald Dwight to lower the flag. This statesmanlike ges-
ture averted a near riot and saved the policemen from possible harm. The political task
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was one of truly keeping the peace. No one can measure the results of the simplest act
performed under such circumstances, but it had a calming effect. The crowd gradually
dispersed. As Al Kramer later recalled. "Sargent responded not to the anger, but to the
idealism and hope of those times."38
Many observers considered the flag incident more as a political statement and
publicity stunt than a genuine peace offering. The Democratic hawks in the legisla-
ture urged Senate president Maurice Donahue to blast Sargent publicly for having
caved in to the student demands. Donahue, who was seeking the Democratic nomi-
nation for governor, was fully aware of Sargent's distinguished military' combat
record in World War II and refused to do so.
Creating a New Cabinet Svstem
Sargent's administrative style evolved considerably between his first and his second
term. During the first, confronted by more than 350 state agencies. Sargent and his
staff were able to do little more than paper over crises, set a few initiatives in mo-
tion, and nurture Sargent's personal image with the media and electorate. In the first
year of Sargent's second term, however, a state cabinet system was created. 39 The
legislature had adopted the cabinet system in 1969. deferring its effective date to
1971 on the assumption that a Democrat would win the governorship in 1970.
Maurice Donahue was not about to place ten patronage plums at Sargent's disposal.
After Sargent prevailed in 1970. the legislature balked for several months at funding
the cabinet offices, but finally relented after Sargent mounted an effective media
campaign.
The reorganization plan established ten new "super" executive agencies. The
cabinet secretaries served at the pleasure of the governor, and their staffs were ex-
empt from civil service. Moreover, their appointments did not require legislative
confirmation. They had tittle statutory authority7, but the governor had broad discre-
tion to delegate agency oversight authority to the secretaries. Sargent, using this
authority to the fullest, also specified that in those matters which the law required
him to act personally, he wanted to be advised by the secretaries rather than directly
by their agencies.
Sargent appointed well-qualified people to the top positions in his administration,
among them Peter Goldmark. secretary of human services. Charles H. Foster, secre-
tary of environmental affairs. Steven Minter. commissioner of public welfare, Tho-
mas Atkins, commissioner of housing, David Liederman, director of the office of
children, and Jack Leff, secretary of elder affairs, to mention only a few. Some of
these appointees were Democrats, which did not sit well with hard-line Republicans.
Steven Minter was recruited from Ohio, where he had been director of the welfare
department of Cuyahoga County. Sargent wanted him to straighten out the mess that
resulted when the state took over the welfare system from the localities in July 1968.
The 351 Massachusetts cities and towns were no longer responsible for welfare, but
the central office was in shambles. There was no standardized payment system for
recipients. Each local office functioned according to the standards of its local direc-
tor so that there were large discrepancies in records. Saddling the department with the
additional task of administering the new Medicaid program simply added to the disarray.
Politicians, depending on their ideological persuasion, wanted to know why recipi-
ents were not being paid promptly, why the welfare rolls were increasing, and why ven-
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dors of medical services were not being reimbursed. The National Welfare Rights Organi-
zation staged several demonstrations to demand increased benefits. Seen against this
background, Minter tried his best to maintain the current level of support and services.
He restructured welfare in Massachusetts, and the workings of the system in a managerial
sense improved. Martha Weinberg concludes:
On most management issues in welfare, the governor was unable to dictate the
behavior of the agency or to ensure that it act as he wanted it to act. For the gover-
nor and his staff, managing welfare seldom offered the possibility of clear rewards.
There was little room for dramatic policy initiation or for intervention that would
capture the public imagination. Instead, Sargent faced constraints on his ability to
control the department accompanied by constant potential for crisis. This was
positive incentive for him to ignore the department whenever possible.40
On another front, Sargent appointed political scientist Robert Wood as chairman
of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), which seemed to be a
natural choice. Wood had just returned from Washington, where he had served first
as undersecretary and then secretary of housing and urban development in the
Lyndon Johnson administration. In Suburbia. Wood wrote that "transportation is the
central reality of the metropolitan community."4 - After his tenure at HUD. he re-
ceived a chance to put his ideas into action locally. On assuming his new post Wood
inquired about the MBTAs equal opportunity office and, to his dismay, found that
no such office existed, a situation he brought to Sargent's attention and took steps to
remedy. The agency had a history of discriminating against minorities. Wood also
oversaw the extension of both the Orange Line and the Red Line. These extensions
dramatically transformed communities like Somerville and Quincy. The Red Line
extension, which brought Davis Square into being, enabled Tufts University to pros-
per and allowed graduate students at Harvard and elsewhere to reside in Somerville.
The same situation developed in Quincy. 42
The Deinstitutionalization of Mental Patients
Frank Sargent named Peter Goldmark, a twenty-nine-year-old whiz kid. as his secre-
tary of human services. Goldmark had previously served in John Lindsay's New-
York City administration. One of his policy objectives, shared by Sargent, was to
move as many people as possible out of the large human service institutions and into
smaller community facilities. Goldmark's strategy relied on forcing bureaucratic
agencies to act by applying pressure from constituency groups at the grassroots
level.
Whatever its merits, Goldmark's strategy of citizen participation was staunchly
resisted by mental health commissioner Milton Greenblatt, who did not favor the
concept of deinstitutionalization. This reform, fueled by federal money, was de-
signed to place mental patients in community residences and halfway houses as an
alternative to warehousing them in large custodial institutions. Under fire from a citi-
zens' task force on children out of school. Greenblatt stonewalled their efforts to monitor
the implementation of Chapter 750. which called for the delivery- of mental health and
educational services to emotionally disturbed youngsters who were at risk. The commis-
sioner also came under attack from a legislative commission that had investigated the
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deaths of four mentally retarded clients at Belchertown. Although an internal probe
conducted by the Department of Mental Health absolved Greenblatt of any negligence
in the matter, the Lolas commission found him partially responsible and called for his
resignation. These events led to his forced departure in December 1972.
After a six-month nationwide search, Sargent replaced Greenblatt with William
Goldman, a San Francisco psychiatrist. Goldman set a new direction for the depart-
ment by allowing the citizen area boards to participate in the budgetary process and
by refusing to curry favor with the medical establishment, which was viewed as a
sacred cow. He viewed the doctors as stubborn resisters of change and impediments
to new policies. Furthermore, he infuriated them by refusing to fund psychiatric
residencies at many of the affiliated university hospitals and clinics. Goldman was
the original architect of closing the state mental hospitals. Over the years these insti-
tutions had suffered from benign neglect and the quality of treatment of patients had
steadily deteriorated. Under Goldman's direction, three mental hospitals (Grafton,
Gardner, and Foxborough) were closed within a span of three years. 43
Closing Juvenile Jails
In October 1969, Sargent appointed Jerome Miller commissioner of youth services.
Born in South Dakota in 1932, Miller grew up in Minnesota and attended college in
the Midwest. After graduation, he entered a Catholic seminary and spent five years
studying for the priesthood. He subsequently left the seminary, joined the U.S. Air
Force, and obtained a doctorate in social work. While stationed in England as a psy-
chiatric social worker, he had developed a community treatment program for troubled
children of air force personnel.44
At the time of his Massachusetts appointment, Miller discovered that nearly one
thousand youngsters were incarcerated in juvenile jails or what were commonly
known as county training schools. Described in the press as "barbaric relics from an
embarrassing past," these institutions were also known for their harsh and inhumane
treatment of children. Grim stories of mental cruelties and physical and sexual abuse
abounded. Not only that, the Department of Youth Services (DYS) was plagued by
controversy and scandal. Most of the staff owed their jobs to political patronage.
After two years of attempting to reform DYS from within, Miller concluded that
"slow change was no change" and that "we could keep it going as long as we went at
it full blast and really kept our heads together around a certain altruism, but no one
should have to depend on someone else's altruism. It's too risky."
Miller, dismayed by what he learned, decided to go for broke. He began closing
the juvenile detention centers during the late fall of 1971. At the outset, he did not
fully apprise the governor of his intentions, but word soon leaked out as the results
became known. By mid-January 1972 he had closed all but one of the institutions,
and the remaining one, Lancaster, housed a substantially reduced population, about
half of whom were participating in a privately run program. The young people were
either paroled home, placed in foster homes, or placed in community-based pro-
grams or group homes. The new program, which was federally funded, made Massa-
chusetts the first state to eliminate juvenile prisons and attracted the attention of
penologists across the nation. DYS spent the remainder of 1972 attempting to cope
with the consequences of the closings, to consolidate the new directions for treat-
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ment of delinquency, and to ward off mounting opposition from the legislature.
DYS was subjected to intensive legislative investigation and public hearings. This
powerful oversight was led by Westfield Democrat Robert McGinn, a former police
officer, who engaged in a bitter feud with Miller. After a shouting match at the State
House, McGinn yelled to reporters, "I'll bury Miller. He's a nut. He's insane. He
belongs in an insane asylum."45 Despite these attacks, Miller had strong allies in
House speaker David Bartley and state representative John McGlynn of Medford.
Better yet, he had the support of Jessie Sargent, who had a keen interest in the issue
and was a strong public advocate for closing juvenile detention centers. He also had
the support of the Boston Globe. Miller would never have been able to accomplish
what he did without the help of these allies.
Miller resigned as commissioner of DYS in January 1973 to take a similar posi-
tion in Ohio. His departure met with reactions as varied as those he had aroused
throughout his stormy thirty-nine months in office. The governor accepted his resig-
nation with public regret; the Boston Globe offered effusive praise; the speaker of
the House lamented the administrative chaos he had left behind; and the legislature
began yet another investigation.
The Park Plaza Urban Renewal Project
In early 1971, the Boston Redevelopment Authority proposed the construction of a
$266 million urban renewal project in downtown Boston. The Park Plaza project,
adjacent to the Boston Public Garden, contained some of the most valuable real
estate in the city.
46 This economic development project, which was viewed by the
news media as Mayor Kevin White's baby, was to be privately financed without any
federal aid. One of the two private developers involved in the project was real estate
tycoon Mortimer Zuckerman, a close friend of the mayor.
Under state law, local urban renewal projects required the approval of the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs (DCA). On May 4, 1972, Sargent appointed Miles
Mahoney its commissioner. Mahoney had previously served as the director of the
Philadelphia Housing Authority. A month later, on June 9, the new commissioner
turned down the Park Plaza project on the grounds that the site, which included
portions of the tawdry Combat Zone, did not meet the "blight" criterion of the law.
Mahoney's finding sparked a heated controversy. His opponents derisively com-
mented that the blight was not the right blight.
Then came the public outcry. Mayor White vigorously objected and filed home
rule legislation designed to circumvent the need for state approval. At the time.
Sargent was in the process of killing the major highways around Boston. In a period
of inflation and high unemployment, he could ill afford to kill all economic develop-
ment projects. The administration desperately needed a political trophy. Disagree-
ments and disappointments were initially glossed over. Al Kramer tried his best to
resolve the dispute, but to no avail. Negotiations were at a standstill.
A revised proposal was submitted to Mahoney, who once again rejected it. He
remained resolute in his opposition and refused to back down, but there were repercus-
sions. Both the business community and organized labor got into the act. Some 10.000
angry construction workers marched on the State House to voice their protests. The
battle, which took on a momentum of its own and grew in intensity, reflected the stresses
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and strains in the administration.
On November 29, 1972, Sargent decided to overrule his DCA commissioner and
to push ahead with the project. Soon afterward the governor fired Mahoney for be-
ing too parochial and rigid and appointed Louis Crampton to replace him. A special
irony lay in the fact that the Park Plaza project was never built. Instead, the state
constructed a huge transportation building on the site.
Hiring and Firing a Corrections Commissioner
Prison reform aroused considerable public attention and controversy in Massachu-
setts in December 1971. The prison uprising in Attica, New York, and its brutal sup-
pression by excessive police force had already shocked the nation. It was a rude
awakening that sparked a similar prison uprising at Walpole. As a consequence of
this disturbance, Massachusetts corrections commissioner John Fitzpatrick resigned.
The Sargent administration conducted an extensive search for a new commissioner
dedicated to prison reform and community-based correctional programs. The
governor's staff was seeking someone who could bridge the gap between inmates
and the community at large. The selection committee chose three finalists from a list
of twenty names. Sargent interviewed each of them and picked John O. Boone. 47
A career civil servant, Boone was a forty-nine-year-old black man from Atlanta
who had been the warden of the federal penitentiary at Lorton, Virginia. Although he
worked at the considerable disadvantage of being from the South, his race proved
even more of an impediment in a department that was almost entirely white. Sargent
and Goldmark did not set out looking for a black commissioner, but when they
found a likely black candidate, they believed he might be better able to relate to
inmates, a large percentage of whom were black. Long persuaded that the Depart-
ment of Corrections (DOC) was an ossified and intransigent bureaucracy, they
wanted someone who would shake things up. The governor told Boone that he
would have "two good years" to implement his programs. "I knew very well, when I
appointed him, there was going to be hell to pay," Sargent said, "and there sure
was."48
The prison world was complex and brutal. Murders, robberies, rapes, and other
forms of brutality occurred between inmates, toward staff, and staff to inmates. On
taking office, Boone promptly removed the superintendents at Walpole and Norfolk
and replaced them with wardens from outside the state. DOC personnel were very
unhappy that he had recruited outside the system. Obviously, Boone wanted to im-
prove conditions within the prisons and to reduce the inmate population, but he
seriously underestimated the countervailing power of the guards and their labor
union.
To the outrage of prison guards, Boone allowed the inmates the right to organize
and to participate in some aspects of prison management. As a result of these ac-
tions, the guards believed they were in grave physical danger. They were infuriated
by what they perceived as a loss of discipline and control of the prisoners. From
their perspective, they had been stripped of their authority and relegated to opening
and closing the cell gates.
The appointment of Boone ignited a firestorm of protest, stirring emotions on all
sides. As the leading figure of prison reform, Boone was out in front on the issue and
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hence the lightning rod for criticism. The Boston Herald launched a concerted campaign
to discredit him. Articles detailing the chaos and disorder that prevailed in the prisons
appeared each week. These stories were advanced so vigorously that the governor's press
secretary, Tom Rcardon, openly questioned their fairness and accuracy.
The political fallout from the Boston Herald stories had the immediate effect of put-
ting Boone on notice that his job was in jeopardy. It also generated a barrage of criticism
from legislators who were being pressured by the guards. Alarmed by the disorder. Senate
president Kevin Harrington fell that the situation had become dangerously out of hand.
Soon editorials calling for firing Boone were being published.
Under intense fire, Boone had to manage a different and more demanding organi-
zational change. While he had his detractors, he also had his defenders. A coalition
of interested citizens, including prison reform advocates, leaders in the black com-
munity, ex-offender groups, and several liberal legislators, staunchly defended him.
Democratic state senator Jack Backman of Brookline was among his most ardent
supporters. As far as these people were concerned, Boone was doing what needed to
be done. The governor showed him steadfast loyalty and declared as much in the
press.
Tensions at Walpole remained high and violence among the inmates erupted
again. On March 17, 1972, Walpole exploded into another major riot that resulted in
considerable damage. Responding to what became known as the Saint Patrick's Day
riot, Boone announced a new training program for the guards and asserted that it
would take $1.3 million dollars to turn the corrections system around. Shortly after
this outburst, a riot occurred at the women's prison in Framingham. Boone dismissed
its new superintendent, only to reinstate her when the guards threatened a walkout.
Protected by civil service rules, she could not be fired without adequate cause.
Meanwhile, Sargent filed his Omnibus Correctional Reform bill on February 9,
1972, as one of his "most important pieces of legislation" for that session. Its central
provisions were logical and linked: halfway houses, work and education release,
furloughs, prison industries, county jail standards, ex-offenders eligible for correc-
tion jobs, and so on. Sargent contributed to the reform effort by placing the prestige
of his office behind it and utilizing his talents in public relations to overcome politi-
cal obstacles. The omnibus bill was passed in July 1972, owing in large measure to
the cooperation of speaker David Bartley, who quietly slipped the bill through the
House without much debate.
A series of dreadful events combined to dramatize the dangerous situation in the
prisons and to seal the commissioner's fate. These included the killing of two prison
guards by a Norfolk inmate; another inmate killed himself when his homemade
bomb accidentally exploded; the inmates at Concord doused the prison chaplain
with gasoline, but state police came to the rescue before they could immolate him;
and a convicted murderer killed again while on furlough. The guards, traumatized by
these horrific events, especially the murders of their fellow guards, staged a one-day
sickout in protest. Sargent attended the funerals where he received a hostile recep-
tion. The guards publicly branded him a murderer. Unaccustomed to such abusive
treatment, he was deeply shaken. He recalled:
But to go to a funeral and as far as you can see, a line on either side of the church, of
corrections officers in uniform from around our state and from surrounding states, from
Rhode Island and elsewhere. And to walk into the church and you get the rumble of a
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boo. And I tried to shake hands with a couple and I got "Go on, f—k you!," and all that
kind of stuff, outside the church. It was a little unnerving to go in and sit in the front
pew with the casket and a woman comes over to beat your brains in, that gets to be
tough. Also you have the television cameras noting that and that doesn't play very well
on the news.49
In the meantime, the savage attacks on Boone continued. Cumulatively, these
assaults pushed a political hot button and made his firing almost inevitable. For
Sargent, under incredible pressure, especially with his reelection campaign less than
a year away, the situation was deteriorating fast.
By the spring of 1973, the governor's staff and Goldmark realized that Boone had
to go. They were convinced that he was a weak administrator and that his continued
presence jeopardized the entire reform program. Goldmark felt that if Boone was
going under, there was no point in wasting any more currency on him. Despite his
public pronouncements, Sargent was not disposed to tolerate further chaos, which
had taken its toll. The time of genuine reckoning had arrived. Sargent explained:
The main reason the whole corrections thing became very tough wasn't merely the
fact we had some violence, somebody killed, the fact we had a strike and all that
sort of stuff. It was the day-to-day pressure from the newspapers. When you're in
public life and you get a few bad headlines it isn't all that much fun, but when you
get them day after day after day and week after week after week, then it gets rug-
ged and you have to do something about it. 50
In the end, Sargent capitulated, but it was not an easy choice for him. He had
great respect for Boone and knew how much the commissioner had suffered during
the long ordeal. Once Sargent decided to fire him, the question became how to do so
without appearing to surrender to the anti-Boone forces.
On the evening of June 20, 1973, the governor went on television and announced
his decision. The tone of his speech was conciliatory. He felt it was important to
praise Boone and his cause, even as he fired him. The stormy Boone era was over.
Ultimately, the governor replaced Boone with Frank A. Hall, who was deputy
commissioner of the North Carolina Department of Prisons. Before long, Hall re-
stored peace to Walpole and the other prisons. He succeeded in keeping the prisons
relatively safe and orderly, while cautiously implementing his package of reforms.
Sargent versus Dukakis
It is interesting to compare Francis Sargent with Michael Dukakis. In many respects,
they were the antithesis of each other, offering a vivid contrast between the pragma-
tist and the idealist, the affable honest broker and the detached policy wonk. Sargent
was more friendly and less driven than Dukakis. They took an instant dislike to each
other at their first meeting. The two governors differed sharply in style and person-
ality. Where Dukakis was cold, aloof, and arrogant, Sargent displayed warmth,
charm, and a remarkable lack of arrogance; where Dukakis was stiff, self-righteous,
and a paragon of virtue, Sargent was relaxed, flamboyant, and profane; where
Dukakis was viewed as a technocrat and a know-it-all, Sargent was perceived as a good
listener who reached out for the views of others. Dukakis was almost devoid of a sense of
humor and therefore unable to empathize and soothe chafed egos the way Sargent did.
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About the only characteristic the two men shared was their. personal frugality.
While Sargent had his strengths, he also had his weaknesses. He haled to fire people
— his most painful task was firing John Boone. He also had difficulty relating to blacks.
As a public manager, Sargent did not focus on details and had a short attention span nor
did he become absorbed in economic development. He was bored by fiscal and adminis-
trative issues. He recognized their importance in principle and appointed excellent
people to handle them, but he assigned them little priority and preferred not to learn
much about them. Hence, he chose not to heed the Cassandra-like warnings of his budget
director and left his successor, Michael Dukakis, a large deficit estimated to be some-
where around $200 million.
Sargent's style was diametrically opposite to that of his nemesis. His centralized
management ran directly counter to Dukakis's hands-on managerial style. Altshuler
puts it even more crisply: "Sargent felt comfortable delegating, and he had no appar-
ent sense of competitiveness with his appointees. He viewed himself as a conductor
rather than star soloist and delighted in surrounding himself with talent."51 Dukakis
was more the star soloist who found it difficult to delegate. Advised of his shortcom-
ings, the "Duke" attempted to change his image with a makeover. After losing the
governorship to Edward King in 1978, he won it back in 1982 by convincing voters
that he was a new, humble, more mellow figure ready to listen. There are many styles
of leadership, so this is not to say that one style is better than another; but there are
significant differences.
With due adjustment for contrasts in their style, character, and personality, there
was a final dissimilarity. Sargent did not have an ideological center, which gave him
a broader range in decision making. He was oriented to make judgments case by
case. Like a classic manager, he retained the facts long enough to make a decision,
then purged his mind of them. What emerged over time was a governor who consis-
tently protected the weak underdog and the environmentalists while acting in ways
that kept him in tune with the populace. Did Sargent change in any important sense
the way governors make their decisions? Close observers of gubernatorial policy
conclude that he did. Alan Altshuler sums up:
Sargent, in short, was a man of politics and concrete decisions. While resistant to
ideology in the abstract, his decisions expressed a consistent set of liberal values.
His interest in management was confined, in general, to selecting key personnel
and inspiring their loyalty. He was a reactive decision-maker in most circum-
stances, one who responded to crises and chose from among the options brought
to him by staff. But he also gave the highest priority to recruiting a diverse and
talented staff; he could be extremely patient when they needed time to generate
fresh options; and he was willing to take major risks on behalf of policies about
which he cared deeply. He had his blind spots, most notably in those areas where
fiscal and administrative detail count for a lot. But he led an exciting administration
with unfailing decency, compassion and integrity.52
The Sargent Legacy
Frank Sargent was respected and admired on Beacon Hill, where he earned a reputation
for objectivity and wise judgment. To this day, Democrats and Republicans still speak
fondly of him. Reflecting on his own experience, former House speaker David Bartley
remarked, "Frank Sargent was one of the finest human beings I've ever met, and certainly
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the best governor I've served under."53 Former Senate president Kevin Harrington put it
somewhat differently, "Sargent had great instincts. He had a political piano tuner's ear;
he had perfect pitch. He could smell whether an idea was good, great, or bad."54
To his credit, Sargent took more stand-up positions on legislation than most of his
predecessors, and in his six years he received the highest percentage of bipartisan
support. Add to the legislative record the policy innovations introduced through
executive orders, gubernatorial memoranda, and rules and regulations, and the
record is even more impressive. He was the first governor to address the manifold
problems of urban life. His cabinet plan matched the best organizational theory of
the decade. No other Republican leader in Massachusetts had so consciously and
successfully developed a strategy for involving experts and academics in the vari-
ous stages of policymaking. Many of his appointments were bold and courageous.
As historians struggle with the Sargent legacy, they will no doubt remember him
for his balanced transportation policy and his policy option of deinstitutionalization.
Whatever the verdict on specific policies, they will remember him most of all as an
environmental visionary. He did more for the cause of the environment than any of
his predecessors and successors.
But Sargent was not an original thinker or a great idea person. He relied on Al
Kramer, Robert Yasi, and others to feed him ideas. They were a dependable policy
source. His wife, Jessie, was the driving force behind Jerome Miller and the mental
health efforts. Of the many participants who influenced policy and programs, the
governor's staff and the Boston Globe played an invaluable role. Sargent had a good
working relationship with the publishers of the Globe as well as with other media
allies.
In Leadership Without Easy Answers, Ronald Heifetz distinguishes between lead-
ers who presume that their responsibility is to make decisions and leaders who help
others to confront problems. Sargent clearly falls into the latter category. He be-
lieved in participatory democracy and sought to develop ways of having ordinary
people get involved in making critical decisions that affected their lives deeply.
Such a phenomenon was entirely new in state politics. Until Sargent came along, the
question of empowering nonestablishment groups remained largely unexplored and
undefined.
One of Sargent's most important legacies was the extent to which he reshaped the
state's judiciary. He filled ninety-seven judgeships, both at the district and at the
superior court levels. This large number of vacancies was the result mainly of a new
law that required judges to retire at age seventy. William Young, the governor's legal
counsel, was largely responsible for coordinating this effort. While patronage con-
siderations were taken into account in appointing district court judges, the same was
not true with regard to superior court judges, who were chosen strictly on merit.
Since there were only a few blacks on the bench, diversity was also a factor. Sargent
appointed David Nelson, a highly respected black lawyer, to the superior court.
Nelson later became a federal district court judge. Overall, the quality of Sargent's
judicial appointments was of the highest rank.
Frank Sargent died on October 22, 1998, at the age of eighty-three. The Boston
Globe published an editorial that captured both his political and his personal legacy.
It is worth quoting at length:
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Francis W. Sargent always acted as if his six years as governor were the most enjoyable
accident that could befall a man. "I got a hell of a big kick out of it," he told the Globe's
John Powers this summer.
The sentiment was mutual. Nearly everyone at the State House from 1969 to
1975 drew on Sargent's infectious sense of enjoyment. This included his top lieu-
tenants as well as the Democratic leaders in the Legislature. If he had an afternoon
meeting with House Speaker David Bartley, Sargent said, he would put out a press
release in the morning blasting him for something or other just so the meeting
would start off on the right foot.
But he did not see politics as a game of tricks requiring deception and guile. He
was a most straightforward political executive, taking on issues with boldness and,
often, vision. He presided during a period of significant transition, when the state
was implementing its takeover of welfare from the cities and towns and was also
taking more responsibility for funding local education and school construction.
One of his most memorable actions was stopping construction of the planned
Inner Belt of highways. His appointments were superior; his Cabinet is widely
viewed as the best of the modern era, with the possible exception of the Cabinet in
Michael Dukakis's third term.
Sargent, an architect by training and a fisherman by choice, would laugh at
attempts to list his accomplishments, but they were considerable. The fact that he
made the state feel good in the process is a legacy to be treasured, and remem-
bered. 55
Frank Sargent made substantial progress in solving the problems that the citizens
of Massachusetts faced, a goal that had eluded his predecessors. Single-minded and
secure in his convictions, he responded effectively to contentious social issues.
Several decades later, such issues still generate controversy. He made his share of
mistakes, but he also made adjustments and moved on. Despite the fact that his ca-
reer ended in defeat, he made a significant impact on the governorship itself. By
seizing the policy initiative and exercising vigorous leadership, he broke the mold
and turned the governor's office into an instrument for social change. That is his
most enduring legacy. $g
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